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ABSTRACT—In Elonis v. United States, decided last term, the Supreme 
Court vacated a conviction for online threats on the ground that the lower 
court erred in its instructions to the jury regarding mens rea. In doing so, 
however, the Court declined to articulate which mens rea standard would 
have sustained a conviction. It is thus currently uncertain which mens rea the 
government must prove when prosecuting online threats under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 875(c). The Elonis Court discussed three potential mens rea standards; as 
universal standards for online threats, each leaves something to be desired. 
Fortunately, federal courts need not decide which standard is best for all 
online threats. Instead, they should adopt libel law’s distinction between 
public and private targets, and similarly apply a heightened mens rea 
standard when the threatening speech at issue targets public figures (or 
implicates “broader public issues”). It won’t always be easy, but drawing this 
distinction will allow courts to achieve the best balance between freedom-
of-speech values and the need to prevent intense psychological harm. 
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In Elonis v. United States,1 the Supreme Court failed to decide exactly 
which mens rea standard the government must prove when it prosecutes an 
individual for making an online threat under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).2 Three 
standards were in play: specific intent, recklessness, and what was 
characterized as either general intent or negligence. The Court’s majority 
held that the last of these is precluded, but left lower courts to face a 
seemingly broad decision between the two remaining options: whether to 
require the government to prove defendants threatening individuals online 
were reckless regarding their choice of words, or whether they specifically 
intended their words be interpreted as threats. 
Part I of this Essay discusses the holding in Elonis v. United States. Part 
II presents the three potential mens rea standards for online threats and shows 
how each standard either over- or underprotects some online speech, and 
proves unsatisfactory as a one-size-fits-all solution. Part III suggests that 
instead of deciding which standard is best for all online threats, lower courts 
should adopt libel law’s distinction between public and private targets,3 and 
similarly apply a heightened mens rea standard of specific intent only when 
the speech at issue targets public figures.4 
 
1 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
2 See infra Part I. 
3 See infra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
4 Distinguishing between “private” and “public” is more art than science, but, like in the libel context, 
courts will develop precedent based on individual facts. See Catherine Hancock, Origins of the Public 
Figure Doctrine in First Amendment Defamation Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 81, 82 (2005) (“In spite 
of the complexities involved in making judicial assessments of public or private figure status, the Supreme 
Court’s commitment to the public figure doctrine has remained unwavering for over 30 years.” (footnote 
omitted)). For a brief discussion of the basic framework for making this determination, see infra notes 
17–18 and accompanying text. 
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Distinguishing between threats against public and private figures, and 
tailoring mens rea accordingly, is the best approach in light of core First 
Amendment principles. A Facebook post containing violent language about 
one’s elected representative implicates free speech values in a way that an 
otherwise similarly threatening post targeting one’s ex-wife does not. It will 
not always be easy, but drawing this distinction will allow courts to achieve 
the best balance between freedom of speech values and the need to prevent 
intense psychological harm. 
I. ELONIS V. UNITED STATES 
18 U.S.C. § 875(c), the statute at issue in Elonis, prohibits 
“transmit[ting] in interstate . . . commerce any communication 
containing . . . any threat to injure the person of another.”5 Anthony Elonis 
was charged under this statute for threatening others online via several 
violently worded Facebook posts referencing various individuals—his ex-
wife, law enforcement officers, and schoolchildren.6 The court instructed 
Elonis’s jury that the Government must prove a reasonable listener would 
have perceived his posts as a “serious expression of an intention to inflict 
bodily injury or take the life of an individual.”7 The court rejected Elonis’s 
request for an instruction that would have required the Government to prove 
Elonis specifically intended to threaten his targets.8 This denial allowed the 
Government to discount Elonis’s testimony during trial—during which he 
claimed the posts were some mixture of art and therapy9—and argue in 
closing “it doesn’t matter what [Elonis] thinks.”10 He was convicted on four 
counts and acquitted of one.11 On appeal, he argued the given instruction was 
insufficient under both the statute and the First Amendment.12 
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a seven-Justice majority, reversed 
Elonis’s convictions, holding that the given jury instruction, which he 
questionably characterized as requiring only negligence,13 was insufficient to 
 
5 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). 
6 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005–07 (providing details of the Facebook posts relating to Elonis’s 
indictment). 
7 Id. at 2007 (quoting jury instructions). 
8 Id. 
9 See id. at 2005–06. 
10 Id. at 2007. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 2004. 
13 Chief Justice Roberts characterizes it as negligence-based because it uses a reasonable actor, like 
traditional negligence determinations, id. at 2011, but the standard is only used to determine whether the 
speech is a threat, not to determine anything with respect to the speaker’s actions (e.g., if they were 
unreasonable). In other contexts (e.g., obscenity, fighting words) the standard is objective, yet survives 
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sustain a conviction under the statute. The Court declined to articulate which 
mens rea standard was required, leaving an open question, both on remand 
in Elonis’s case and more generally for all prosecutions of online threats 
under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c): what mens rea standard applies to those who 
threaten others online? 
II. MENS REA MATTERS: THREE UNSATISFACTORY 
UNIVERSAL STANDARDS 
There are three potential mens rea standards discussed in Elonis. First, 
Elonis argued that the Government must prove the speaker specifically 
intended to threaten his target.14 Second, Justice Thomas adopted the 
Government’s position in his dissent, finding the trial court’s articulation of 
a general intent standard satisfactory.15 Finally, Justice Alito, concurring in 
the judgment, opined that the First Amendment requires the Government to 
prove Elonis was reckless as to whether his posts constituted threats.16 As 
proposed universal standards for online threats, each standard leaves 
something to be desired, showing the need for the hybrid standard introduced 
in Part III. 
All three standards elide a distinction between online threats directed at 
public figures and those directed at private individuals. Searching for a 
bright-line rule separating private from public figures is quixotic, but the 
Court has endorsed the following distinction: 
For the most part those who attain [the status of public figure] have assumed 
roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of 
such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all 
purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust 
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to 
influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite 
attention and comment.17 
The prominence obtained must be “especial”: someone cannot be a 
public figure whose public profile is “much like those of countless members 
of his profession.”18 The difference between public and private figures 
affects the First Amendment calculus: the target’s identity can serve as a 
 
First Amendment scrutiny and is not characterized as merely negligence. See id. at 2027 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
14 See id. at 2012 (majority opinion) (stating Elonis opposed recklessness standard at oral argument). 
15 Id. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
16 Id. at 2015–16 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
17 Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134 (1979) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 345 (1974)). 
18 Id. at 135. 
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useful proxy for whether the speech attacking him or her has broader 
significance. This follows from the understanding that violent-sounding 
words directed against a public figure, although expressed in threatening 
language, may in fact communicate some inchoate political idea with 
broader significance, a notion with which other people can agree or disagree. 
(As will be discussed in Part II.C, libel law relies on this distinction, 
imposing a heightened mens rea standard when the target of the libel is a 
public figure.) 
A. Specific Intent 
The most defendant-friendly standard would require proof that the 
speaker specifically intended to threaten his target. In its amicus brief, the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) explained: the Internet is the 
quintessential public forum, and as a medium its speech is “often 
abbreviated, idiosyncratic, decontextualized, and ambiguous . . . [subjecting 
it] to multiple interpretations,”19 therefore courts must “ensure adequate 
breathing room” for “core political, artistic, and ideological speech.”20 
A specific intent requirement, however, would overprotect threats 
directed at private targets, which have negligible First Amendment value. 
The ACLU’s arguments are not terribly persuasive as applied to posts like 
Elonis’s, which he asserts were either artistic or therapeutic;21 Justice Alito 
is correct that a “fig leaf of artistic expression cannot convert such hurtful, 
valueless threats into protected speech.”22 That Elonis targeted private 
individuals against whom he had personal grudges23 means “‘[t]here is no 
threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential 
interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas’; and ‘the threat of liability’ 
 
19 Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, 
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983), 2014 WL 4215752. 
20 Id. at 5. See generally Frederick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The 
Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 217 (discussing Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), 
and stating “both the Commonwealth of Virginia and the Black majority (and, perhaps, the Black 
dissenters as well) believed that the First Amendment imposed upon Virginia a requirement that the 
threatener have specifically intended to intimidate”); Paul T. Crane, Note, “True Threats” and the Issue 
of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV. 1225 (2006). 
21 See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2005–06 (majority opinion). 
22 Id. at 2017 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Obscenity law also embraces an 
objective definition of art. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973) (holding work that 
“appeals to the prurient interest, . . . describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct[,] . . . [and 
that], taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” can be prohibited 
consistent with the First Amendment). 
23 Cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011) (noting “no pre-existing relationship or conflict 
between [the speaker] and [the target of the speech] that might suggest [the speaker’s] speech on public 
matters was intended to mask an attack on [the target] over a private matter”). The schoolchildren are an 
exception, as he had never met them, but his threat did not carry any detectable political message.  
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does not pose the risk of a ‘reaction of self-censorship’ on matters of public 
import.”24 
B. General Intent 
The Government, and Justice Thomas, took the opposite position on the 
proposed mens-rea spectrum, arguing—as most Courts of Appeals weighing 
in have25—that First Amendment concerns are sufficiently addressed by the 
objective definition of “threat.” This definition, in the view of these 
proponents, adequately protects the speaker from being silenced by easily 
offended listeners.26 Thus, under the Government’s position, the instruction 
at issue in Elonis, whether characterized as requiring proof of general intent 
or negligence, should have been permissible, especially in light of the 
extensive harm caused by online threats.27 The damage to victims, including 
long-lasting psychological harm, does not depend on the speaker’s state of 
mind.28 Online threats also chill speech of both their targets and those who 
remain silent to avoid a similar fate.29 In-person threats also chill speech of 
their targets, but the public nature of many online threats suggests their 
chilling effect on third-party observers is likely stronger than their offline 
counterparts. More broadly, of what value are posts reasonably conveying a 
serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily injury or take the life of 
an individual? Note that the Government’s concerns apply equally to threats 
targeting private and public figures. 
This approach has considerable appeal, especially as applied to private 
threats like Elonis’s. However, as a proposed universal standard that would 
apply to threats against public figures, it is in serious tension with First 
Amendment precedent, specifically the Court’s imposition of heightened 
mens rea requirements for libel, both in civil and criminal contexts.30 Libel 
 
24 Id. at 1215–16 (emphasis added) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 
472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985) (opinion of Powell, J.)). 
25 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2018 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
26 See id. at 2027–28 (discussing objective definition of “fighting words” and “obscenity”; suggesting 
threats should be treated similarly). 
27 See generally Brief of the National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondent at 2–3, 10, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13-983), 2014 WL 
5013749 (describing harms to victims such as reducing “ability to sleep, eat, and work”). 
28 See id. 
29 See, e.g., Catherine Buni & Soraya Chemaly, The Unsafety Net: How Social Media Turned Against 
Women, ATLANTIC (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/10/the-unsafety-
net-how-social-media-turned-against-women/381261 [http://perma.cc/MFQ7-H5GT] (describing 
deterrence and chilling impact). 
30 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (extending to criminal prosecutions the New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), rule requiring a false statement about a public official 
be made with “actual malice” in order to grant civil damages). 
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too has an objective element, that of the truth or falsity of the statement,31 
raising the question: why protect demonstrably false statements of fact that 
injure the reputation of another? The Court has answered: ensuring no 
chilling of protected speech requires “breathing space” for speakers, created 
by precluding liability unless speakers were negligent (private target) or 
reckless (public target) with respect to the risk of falsehood.32 But, as Justice 
Thomas points out, the Court has declined to accord this mens rea buffer to 
speakers of fighting words or makers of obscenity, who are protected only 
by those categories’ objective definitions.33 So, are online threatening 
statements more like libelous ones, on the one hand, or fighting words and 
obscenity, on the other? 
Threats, libelous statements, and fighting words all have targets, and 
obscenity does not. The identity of targets helps segregate statements into 
categories more (and less) worthy of protection; because obscenity lacks this 
feature, treating all of it the same makes sense. While online threats, libelous 
statements, and fighting words all risk upsetting public order, the key First 
Amendment distinction between these categories of speech is the nature of 
the risk. In prosecuting fighting words, the government is protecting the 
speaker: his words could get him beaten up.34 On the other hand, in 
prosecuting libel and online threats, the government is protecting the target.35 
This difference matters, because the First Amendment protects 
“vehement, caustic, and . . . unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and 
public officials”36 to a greater extent than those on private ones.37 In other 
words, the Court has required public figures to endure harsher treatment than 
private figures. Treating threatened public figures like public targets of libel 
is consistent with First Amendment principles: both are subject to 
(sometimes severe) psychological distress, yet the statements at issue are 
sometimes indistinguishable from those truly worth protecting. With libelous 
statements, the mens rea standard protects the possibility that the libelous 
statement is true, though not provable. With threats, the standard should 
 
31 See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) (describing 
California’s libel law). 
32 See infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text. 
33 See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2027–28 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
34 Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (fighting words, “when addressed to the ordinary 
citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction [against the 
speaker]”). 
35 Cf. Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 
290–91 (2001) (listing four rationales for prosecuting threats). 
36 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (emphasis added). 
37 See infra notes 45, 48 and accompanying text. 
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protect expressions of outrage against a public figure, the public figure’s 
actions, or the public figure’s ideology.38 
Giving wide berth to these statements ensures consistency with the 
Court’s goal “to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that 
we do not stifle public debate.”39 Note that this analysis might not extend to 
face-to-face threats, at least not to those made in private. (It does not even 
properly include all “online threats,” but only publicly viewable ones. Even 
on social media there are private channels of communication: a threatening 
Direct Message on Twitter, even one directed at a public figure, does not 
merit protection even if an identically worded one in a publicly viewable 
tweet would.40 Threats made through the latter avenues more closely 
resemble face-to-face threats and similarly do not merit a heightened level 
of protection.) 
Public, online threats raise First Amendment issues. Therefore, even if 
an objective definition adequately protects the speech of online bullies who 
target private individuals, this standard (and its lack of a recklessness mens 
rea requirement) underprotects the words of those openly attacking public 
targets. 
C. Recklessness 
Between the defendant’s specific-intent and Justice Thomas’s general-
intent standards, Justice Alito charts a middle course, advocating for a 
recklessness requirement. He asserts that “recklessness regarding a risk of 
serious harm is wrongful conduct,”41 and that this standard will not result in 
wrongfully convicting someone for protected First Amendment expression.42 
In finding it provides “adequate breathing space” in the threat context, 
Justice Alito invokes New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, yet elides its crucial 
distinction43: the First Amendment requires public officials to demonstrate a 
speaker’s recklessness before they can recover damages for statements made 
“relating to [their] official conduct.”44 Ten years after New York Times, the 
 
38 See infra Part III (describing threats as potential ideas in more detail). 
39 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (emphasis added). 
40 See, e.g., About Direct Messages, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/14606 
[http://perma.cc/CFH3-CYQR] (stating Twitter users can “use Direct Messages to have private 
conversations with [other] Twitter users about Tweets and other content”). A similar dichotomy exists 
with in-person statements: compare someone encountering a Senator on a cul-de-sac and threatening her, 
with that same person yelling those same words at her at a populated rally for her reelection. 
41 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2015 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
42 See id. at 2016. 
43 Id. at 2017 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)). 
44 New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
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Court held that, with respect to statements made about private individuals, 
the First Amendment imposed only a negligence standard on libel suits.45 
Justice Alito also relies on46 Garrison v. Louisiana, which extended the 
reasoning of New York Times to criminal prosecutions,47 but that case’s 
holding and reasoning, like in New York Times, depended on statements 
targeting public figures. In Garrison, the Court rejected the lower court’s 
conclusion that the defendant’s statement constituted “purely private 
defamation,”48 suggesting, consistent with civil libel case law, that a lesser 
standard would have applied had it been so. Justice Alito would collapse this 
distinction as applied to online threats, suggesting the justification for it no 
longer applies, or does not apply to online threats. But as this Part has argued, 
and as Part III will further demonstrate, it does. 
III. A HYBRID APPROACH 
Courts can more precisely balance the First Amendment interests of the 
speaker against the need to protect the target from threats of harm by using 
a two-part approach. This approach should focus on the identity of the target 
and impose a higher mens rea standard when the target is a public figure. 
This Part will explain why this is a distinction with a difference, albeit only 
from society’s—and not the target of the threat’s—perspective. The harm to 
the threat’s target is the same, but threats directed at public figures more 
likely involve public issues, and as such deserve some First Amendment 
protection, despite the serious harm to innocent victims threats predictably 
cause.49 
Angry online speech attacking public figures is more likely to convey 
an idea on important public issues than that targeting private individuals; 
thus, it is more deserving of First Amendment protection. The Court has 
recognized that “speech concerning public affairs is more than self-
expression; it is the essence of self-government.”50 In the context of threats, 
this means that there is a greater risk a “threat” against a public official is not 
solely a “threat,” but also an entry into the marketplace of ideas (albeit a 
frightening one). Someone writing something threatening about President 
Barack Obama online, especially if the two have never met, might very well 
be expressing some rudimentary political opposition; someone threatening 
 
45 Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).  
46 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2015. 
47 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). 
48 Id. at 76. 
49 Cf. supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text (describing harm from online threats). 
50 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74–75. 
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his ex-wife is almost certainly not.51 The words of the threat are more worthy 
of Constitutional protection in the first instance than in the second, and using 
the identity of the target allows courts to distinguish between the two without 
evaluating the content of the speech. 
For better or worse, the First Amendment requires that public figures 
withstand more severe verbal and written abuse than private individuals. 
That speech targets a public figure is a sufficient but not necessary condition 
for bestowing First Amendment protection on it. Even if the target is a 
private one, if speech has even a faint political or ideological bent to it, the 
First Amendment will shield it. For example, the funeral for Marine Matthew 
Snyder became a target for the Westboro Baptist Church, which stirred up 
publicity and then picketed his funeral (standing about 250 feet outside of 
it), singing hateful songs throughout.52 The Court, while acknowledging that 
Westboro’s speech “is certainly hurtful and its contribution to public 
discourse may be negligible,” found that it “addressed matters of public 
import” and did so “on public property [and] in a peaceful manner.”53 
Therefore, despite testimony that the speech caused Snyder’s father Albert 
“emotional anguish [that] had resulted in severe depression and had 
exacerbated pre-existing health conditions,” the speech was fully protected 
by the First Amendment, precluding even civil liability.54 
Threats, like libel, are exceptions to the First Amendment’s prohibition 
on content-based restrictions,55 so they need not be protected in an absolute 
manner like the nonthreatening and nonlibelous opinion statements of the 
Westboro Baptist Church. Yet the same rationale that moved the Court to 
protect hate speech in that case, the fear of “stifl[ing] public debate,”56 even 
when the “debate” at issue is a one-sided screed, suggests caution when 
prosecuting online threats. Remaining true to the First Amendment’s 
animating principle requires mens rea protection for speakers of online 
threats against public officials. 
 
51 Cf. Kyle A. Mabe, Note, Long Live the King: United States v. Bagdasarian and the Subjective-
Intent Standard for Presidential “True Threat” Jurisprudence, 43 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 51, 57–58 
(2013) (advocating specific intent requirement for threats against the President or presidential candidates 
for this and other reasons). 
52 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011). 
53 Id. at 1220. 
54 Id. at 1214, 1220. 
55 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2027–28 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Obscenity law 
also presents a potentially instructive analogy for the Court’s “threat” jurisprudence. See The Supreme 
Court, 2014 Term — Leading Case, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 331, 336–40 (2015). 
56 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220. 
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CONCLUSION 
Since Elonis held general intent insufficient for online threat 
prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), lower courts are left with two mens 
rea options. Federal courts need not decide whether Justice Alito’s 
recklessness standard or the more protective specific intent requirement 
strikes a better balance for all online threats; each court should focus on the 
precise threat before it and, guided by libel case law, decide whether the 
target is a private individual or a public figure. After making this 
determination, courts should instruct juries on recklessness when the threat 
is to a private individual, and on specific intent when the defendant has 
targeted a public figure. 
That is not to say the Court in Elonis got it right; in fact, I think it did 
not. Elonis targeted private individuals, and did not appear to raise any issues 
of “public import” with his threats that would make them at all analogous to 
the Westboro Baptist Church’s funeral-protest speech. As such, the analogy 
to libel law would suggest an affirmance of his conviction: the objective-
listener requirement, coupled with general intent negligence, adequately 
protects the limited First Amendment values at stake in his posts. His threats 
against his ex-wife, among others, are no more valuable than demonstrably 
false statements of fact harming the reputation of a private individual: they 
both cause serious harm and do not add anything appreciable to the public 
marketplace of ideas, so a negligence-type standard should be acceptable. 
Following from this, online threats against public figures or threats that 
implicate broader public issues should require the government to prove 
recklessness on the part of the speaker.57 
  
 
57 Of course, none of these First Amendment strictures restrain the private social media companies 
that created the platforms for all the threatening language discussed in this Essay; they can do much more 
than the government can to stop it (or at least quickly remove it). Cf., e.g., Editorial, Hate Speech on 
Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/31/opinion/misogynist-
speech-on-facebook.html [http://perma.cc/9MXY-AGLW] (discussing how Facebook “belatedly moved 
to further restrict hate speech that glorified violence against women” after advocacy groups gathered 
petitions and alerted advertisers). 
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